(RE)EXAMINING THE CITICORP CASE:
Ethical Paragon or Chimera
by Eugene Kremer
The architect for the fifty-nine-story Citicorp Center tower
completed during 1977 in midtown Manhattan was the much-celebrated
Hugh Stubbins. The renowned structural engineer William LeMessurier
was responsible for the conception and design of the building’s
ingenious structural framing system.
As part of the land acquisition negotiation for Citicorp Center
it was agreed that Saint Peter’s Lutheran Church located on one
corner of the nearly full-block site since 1903 would retain its
location. Citicorp would erect a new church building and, as part of
its new headquarters complex, an office tower utilizing a portion of
the air rights above the church.
That decision led to a unique structural system for a tower
supported on a central service core and four 114-foot high piers
placed not at the corners, but at the center of each tower face. The
edges of the tower floors were then supported on a series of
enormous eight-story-high cantilevered steel frames transferring
their loads seventy-two feet from each corner to columns centered
above the nine-story-high piers.
The extraordinary structural efficiency of the steel frame made
the tower significantly lighter than a conventional structure of its
height and therefore far more subject to lateral harmonic vibration
due to the buffeting of winds. Working with other consultants,
LeMessurier designed an innovative system to diminish the
accelerations caused by the vibration. The tuned mass damper, a
block of concrete weighing more than four hundred tons floating on a
film of oil and linked to the top of the structural frame by
hydraulic springs, was the first of its kind in a tall building.
Citicorp Center was designed and constructed during an extended
period of economic malaise in the city. In the 1970s dozens of major
corporations departed, 600,000 jobs were lost,1 and, in
the face of a fiscal crisis, the President’s 1975 decision on
Federal aid prompted the legendary Daily News headline “FORD
TO CITY: DROP DEAD.”2 Even before its completion,
full-page color advertisements appeared featuring a photo-realistic
view of the new church and the soaring tower. Citicorp’s ad copy
A skyscraper in the New
York tradition, 59 stories. A multi-million-dollar investment in New
York. New York is our town. . . .We grew up here. We’re staying
The tower, clad in alternating ribbons of bright aluminum and
glass, and crowned with a triangular prism, added a dramatic new
corporate icon to the city’s storied skyline. No less significant
in attracting public and professional attention and praise was the
design of the elements at the base of the tower. An enormous
skylight illuminated a seven-story galleria, and a lushly landscaped
courtyard was surrounded by shops and restaurants linked to brick
paved public outdoor spaces incorporating seating, sweeping stepped
terraces, access to the subway, and space for concerts and other
events sponsored by Citicorp and by the church (the “jazz church”
as it is commonly referred was well-known for holding block-long
events—including the memorial service for Louis Armstrong).
Stubbins and his collaborators had succeeded. The new building
epitomized the client’s intention to create a visible statement
announcing its corporate identity, celebrating its steadfast loyalty
to New York, its commitment to innovation, and its performance as a
responsible citizen in the neighborhood and the larger city.
Extended feature articles in leading American and international
architectural journals extolled the project. Citicorp Center was the
subject of broad attention as well as great praise in the popular
media. The city, the client, the architect, the structural engineer,
and the multitude of others that had contributed to realization of
the project took understandable pride in what had been created. More
than a generation later, the tower remained a New York landmark, and
an important symbol for the successor owner, Citigroup, which
adorned its 1999 Annual Review with a striking image of the
still-potent corporate icon.
The initial acclaim had not subsided when, through a series of
serendipitous events, William LeMessurier recognized in June 1978
that the Citicorp tower’s steel frame was structurally inadequate.4
Information about the details of his discovery and the actions
that averted an epic disaster was secreted for the better part of
two decades by LeMessurier, other engineers, academics, attorneys,
equipment manufacturers, construction contractors, government
officials, public safety and emergency response agencies, and by the
client, Citicorp. Once the public silence was broken in an extended
May 29, 1995 article in The New Yorker, the case quickly
became a staple element in engineering and architectural ethics
teaching. In virtually every instance I have discovered, William
LeMessurier’s professional behavior and ethical conduct, as well
as that of the other participants, has received high praise.
Representative examples include:
1) The Online Ethics Center for Engineering and Science web site
which describes five detailed cases “of scientist and engineers in
difficult circumstances who. . .demonstrated wisdom that enabled
them to fulfill their responsibilities. . . .Their actions provide
guidance for others who want to do the right
thing in circumstances that are similarly difficult.”5
Roger Boisjoly and the space shuttle Challenger disaster,
Rachel Carson and pesticides, Frederick Cuny and efforts to aid
refugees in third world countries, Inez Austin and the Hanford
Nuclear Reservation, and William LeMessurier and the Citicorp Center
tower are the subjects of these cases.
2) The IIT (Illinois Institute of Technology) Center for the
Study of Ethics in the Professions’s web site states:
On 26 March 1997 on IIT’s
main campus, William J. LeMessurier one of the nation’s leading
structural engineers told the dramatic story of when he “blew th
[sic] whistle” on himself in 1978. This lecture was co-sponsored
by the CSEP, College of Architecture and the Department of Civil and
Architectural Engineering and was part of the Ethics Center’s 20th
3) The Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering Education
and Practice, published by the American Society of Civil
Engineers, reprinted The New Yorker article in full during
1997 and editorialized “LeMessurier’s exemplary behavior—
encompassing honesty, courage, adherence to ethics, and social
responsibility— during the ordeal remains a testimony to the ideal
meaning of the word, ‘professional.’ ”7
4) The New Yorker article is reprinted in its entirety in Professional
Practice 101, published in 1997 by John Wiley, a well-received
volume addressed to university students and young architectural
practitioners. In a brief preface, the book’s author, architect
and educator Andy Pressman, FAIA, describes the Citicorp case as a
“stunning example of good ethics in action.”8
5) Ethics in Engineering Practice and Research, published
in 1998 by Cambridge University Press, includes detailed accounts of
two cases: the efforts of Roger Boisjoly in the space shuttle Challenger
disaster and the role of William LeMessurier in the Citicorp Center
tower crisis. Each engineer is praised for demonstrating “how
courage, honesty and concern for safety are implemented in
6) The second edition of Engineering Ethics: Concepts and
Cases, published in 2000 by Wadsworth, opens chapter 1 with a
full-page photograph of Citicorp tower and a laudatory essay on the
case. The second essay is on the Challenger disaster, and the
final piece is on the work of engineer Frederick Cuny in responding
to disasters caused by war and natural forces in nations across the
globe. The authors explain that “engineers play a vital role in
protecting and assisting the public and that this requires not only
basic engineering competence. . .but also imagination, persistence,
and a strong sense of responsibility.” They go on to say “as the
cases illustrate, sometimes this may require great courage.”10
7) The National Council of Architectural Registration Boards’ (NCARB)
professional development monograph series aids registered architects
in fulfilling mandatory continuing education requirements
established by the states and by the American Institute of
Architects. Published in 2000, the Professional Conduct monograph
was written by a distinguished Boston attorney who had served for
more than a decade as council to the NCARB Committee on Professional
Conduct. Observing that “there are singular instances of
professional rectitude that exemplify the core values of competence,
accountability and honesty underlying the [NCARB] Rules of Conduct,”11
the author cites William LeMessurier’s efforts in the Citicorp
case and incorporates the full text of The New Yorker article
in an appendix.
A high-profile corporate client, world-famous design
professionals, an innovative landmark skyscraper in the congested
center of the nation’s largest city, and the prospect of a
catastrophic structural failure provide an abundance of material for
a compelling tale. Add to that the received wisdom of ethicists that
the Citicorp case exemplifies the best in professional ethical
behavior and the stage is set for critical reexamination. I will
briefly examine six facets of the Citicorp Center tower case.
LeMessurier employed an ingenious, radically unconventional
structural frame in the Citicorp tower. He reports considering only
wind loading normal to the building faces. The Building Code of the
City of New York did not call for analysis of so-called quartering
winds and LeMessurier states that he did not examine the effects of
quartering winds until after Citicorp tower was occupied. It was
then that he discovered the unexpectedly high stresses they produced
on the structural frame.12
In some respects the design of virtually every building is a
prototype. Nonetheless, when a major departure from conventional
practice is contemplated for a key element effecting the safety of
an enormous urban structure, the professional has an obligation to
ensure that the analyses employed go beyond the routine techniques
developed for structures transferring loads in significantly
Like many other laws and regulations safeguarding public safety,
building codes specify minimum standards and they do not necessarily
reflect the state of the art or the prevailing standard of care.
Indeed, although during the early 1970s the New York Building Code
made no mention of wind loads other than those produced by winds
acting at right angles to building faces, many other tall structures
in New York and elsewhere had been designed considering the effects
of quartering winds. Until adoption of a new code in late 1968, New
York had required that all structures be designed “to resist, in
the structural frame, horizontal wind pressure from any direction.”13
The distinguished engineer Matthys Levy, Executive Vice President
and Director, Structural Division of the National Academy of
Engineering and author of Why Buildings Fall Down14
observes, “From the code point of view, it is implicit that wind
from any direction should be considered, even if not stated
Further, two senior members of William LeMessurier’s firm who
were directly involved with Citicorp state that quartering winds
were considered early in the development of the building’s frame.
From the start of conceptual design in 1970, Robert J. McNamara was
the managing principal for Citicorp in LeMessurier Associates’
Cambridge office. McNamara states that at the time of the tower’s
design it was customary for engineers to consider the effects of
quartering winds on the structure of tall buildings. He reports that
for Citicorp tower “the effects of quartering wind were originally
studied by Bill LeMessurier” who “concluded that the quartering
wind did not govern the design and need not be further considered.”16
Stanley Goldstein was partner in charge of LeMessurier Associates’
New York office where the construction drawings for the tower were
prepared. Goldstein states that in the design of tall buildings “quartering
wind is always considered.”17 He explains that Citicorp’s
“wind bracing system, which seemed so simple and easy to
understand. . .proved to be deceptive.”18 “The
unusual structure of Citicorp made it seem obvious that it could
easily withstand quartering once it was designed for broadside
LeMessurier’s design and the tower’s construction drawings
called for five, full- penetration welded joints in each of the
eight-story-high diagonal steel members transferring loads from the
tower’s corners to the columns at the center of each face.
Offering Citicorp a credit of $250,000, the structural steel
fabricator proposed substituting bolted joints. The proposal was
accepted. Employing the loads at each joint calculated by
LeMessurier’s firm, the fabricator designed bolted connections and
prepared shop drawings that were then reviewed and approved by the
engineers for fabrication and construction. Although less strong
than welded joints, the bolted connections were entirely adequate
for the designated loads. LeMessurier reports that it was his
associates in the New York office who studied the proposal and
approved the change. He asserts that he learned of the substitution
only after Citicorp’s completion during a conversation about using
full-penetration welded connections for another project.20
When a major departure from the construction documents is
proposed for a critical system effecting the health, safety, and
welfare of the public, the decision ought to involve the key persons
in the design of the system. Robert McNamara states that he reviewed
the proposal to use bolted rather than welded connections and
presented the suggested change to Bill LeMessurier. We discussed the
technical implications and did calculations as to what effect the
bolt extension in the connection would have on the movement of the
tower . . . .LeMessurier Cambridge approved the substitution for
concept, LeMessurier New York approved the actual details and
capacities on the steel shop drawings.21
LeMessurier acknowledges that his analyses undertaken after the
building was completed and occupied revealed that quartering winds
produced far higher stresses in the diagonal members than had been
understood. Emergency consultations in Canada with the director and
staff of the wind tunnel laboratory, where tests had been run on a
model of the tower while it was still in design during 1973, led to
appreciation that the problem was significantly more critical than
he had realized. Returning from Canada to Cambridge, he met with a
trusted colleague, drove to his Maine summer home where for several
days he carefully worked through a series of detailed structural
calculations and concluded that failure of a bolted joint at the
thirtieth floor was likely in a sixteen-year storm. Among the
courses of action he briefly considered was driving along the Maine
Turnpike at a hundred miles an hour and steering into a bridge
abutment without telling anyone else about the problem he had
Without addressing the ethics of suicide in general, since
LeMessurier states that he could have hidden his knowledge of the
flawed structure, his contemplation of suicide could hardly have
been more irresponsible. His explanation that “I didn’t think
about it very long because. . .if I did that I would miss finding
out how the story ended. . .and that might be a rather stimulating
experience”23 evidences his focus on himself rather
than on the safety of the public or the welfare of his client.
LeMessurier also explains that he contemplated remaining silent
about the inadequacy of the tower’s structural frame. Observing
that only staff members at the laboratory where the tower’s
responses to wind forces had been modeled knew of the full
implication of the problem, LeMessurier opined “My friends up in
Canada were so professional, they would keep their traps shut
forever.”24 LeMessurier’s confident assertion that as
a matter of professional responsibility his Canadian colleagues
would preserve his secret suggests remarkable indifference to
ordinary morality and fundamental misunderstanding of professional
ethics. So, too, did his 1996 declaration to an audience of M.I.T.
engineering faculty and students that he knew of an important
fifty-story building that was likely to collapse, that was “totally
under-designed,” but that he would not identify, followed by his
assertion that “there are a lot of them out there.”25
In actuality LeMessurier informed the architect’s attorney, his
own liability insurance company, the architect, and the owner. Soon
afterward other engineers, consultants, and contractors were engaged
to study, monitor, and repair the building. Local building
officials, the Red Cross, the police, and other emergency response
agencies were told of the situation and plans for remediating the
structural inadequacies of the tower were developed and implemented.
Early in the repair process, the owner knowingly issued a grossly
misleading statement to the press obscuring the reality of the
threat the building posed to the public health, safety, and welfare.
LeMessurier was not only aware of the false public statement, he had
supplied the kernel of truth regarding new data on marginally higher
likely wind speeds that was then spuriously used as the explanation
for the remedial welding of two-inch-thick by six-foot-long steel
plates over hundreds of bolted joints in the structural frame.26
In a Wall Street Journal interview Henry DeFord III,
Citicorp Senior Vice President responsible for the corporation’s
building operations, explained “engineers have assured the bank
that the building isn’t in any danger. The work is being done ‘to
anticipate the impossible that might happen.’ ”27
Contacted by the New York Daily News, DeFord elaborated:
As it is, the building
could withstand a one-hundred-year wind. . . .We are a very
cautious organization—we wear both belts and suspenders here. We
dont [sic] want people concerned, so we sent out a press release
announcing the work.28
Although the highest wind speed ever recorded in Manhattan was
113mph, later in the same August 9, 1978 Daily News story,
Acting Building Commissioner Blaise Parascandola used his position
of public trust to further the deception by observing, “of course
it’s improbable, but there’s always the chance of winds up to
150mph, which. . .could break bolts. This way we’ll be safe.”29
On the basis of the news release and an interview with
LeMessurier, the August 17, 1978 issue of Engineering News Record
reported “LeMessurier maintains that the. . .tower has well over
the structural support it requires to withstand anticipated wind
loads and that the purpose of the extra bracing is simply to
supplement it.” The article continued, “LeMessurier declines to
say, however, whether he feels the bracing is necessary or optional.
‘I advised the bank and they listened to me,’ he says. ‘As the
bank put it, “we’d like to have belts and suspenders.” ’”30
None of the other architectural, engineering and legal
professionals, public officials, or contractors involved in averting
the disaster stepped forward to correct what they knew to be the
false news release, or the subsequent statements by officers of
Citicorp, the Department of Buildings, and by LeMessurier
compounding the misrepresentations.
There are just six fundamental canons in the National Society of
Professional Engineers Code of Ethics. Canon 3 states that in the
fulfillment of their professional duties engineers shall “Issue
public statements only in an objective and truthful manner.”31
Elaborate emergency evacuation plans were developed not only for
the Citicorp tower, but also for 156 city blocks32 in the
neighborhood of what was then the seventh tallest building in the
world. These events took place during mid- and late summer, the
hurricane season, when the greatest threat of structural failure
inducing wind speeds existed. The plans were kept secret from the
general public, from other property owners, and tens of thousands of
residents, shop and office workers, and others in the neighborhood
who were to be informed only if a hurricane were bearing down on New
York. “A Red Cross estimate indicated that if the building
collapsed, up to 200,000 people could lose their lives.”33
The autonomy of other stakeholders was denied by the
paternalistic behavior to which LeMessurier, Stubbins, Citicorp
officers, Red Cross, city officials and a host of others were party.
Speaking at M.I.T. on November 17, 1995, LeMessurier told his
audience of faculty members and engineering students at a videotaped
Mechanical Engineering Colloquium:
We had to cook up a
line of bull, I’ll tell you. And white lies at this point are
entirely moral. You don’t want to spread terror in the community
to people who don’t need to be terrorized. We were terrorized, no
question about that.34
“Engineering Ethics,” an October 1996 cover story in the
American Society of Civil Engineers’ journal Civil Engineering
described Citicorp Center, its design, the discovery of its
structural flaws and the emergency repairs.35 The story
was influential in stimulating the National Society of Professional
Engineers (NSPE) Board of Ethical Review (BER) to consider a
scenario strikingly similar to the facts of Citicorp.36
Published as Case 98–9, the BER based its findings on six sections
of the NSPE Code of Ethics in concluding that while
[t]he desire to avoid
public panic is certainly a legitimate factor in deciding on a
course of action. . .withholding critical information from thousands
of individuals whose safety is compromised over a significant period
of time is not a valid alternative. . . .37
The BER considered Case 98–9 important and interesting enough
to justify its use as the basis of the 1999 NSPE BER Ethics Contest
open to all NSPE members, state societies and chapters.38
The subject of a feature story in the NSPE Engineering Times39
magazine and another in Engineering Ethics Update40
published by the National Institute for Engineering Ethics, the
winning entry reached essentially the same conclusions as had the
Advancing Professional Knowledge
LeMessurier took care after these events in the late 1970s to
obscure his experience and new understandings from his peers in the
engineering community. Not until the laudatory 1995 article was
published in The New Yorker, did engineering professionals,
and the larger public, become aware of the near disaster and its
The responsibility to advance the knowledge and usefulness of the
profession was ignored by LeMessurier for almost two decades. The
October 30, 1995 issue of Engineering News Record reported
that although LeMessurier himself had brought the problems to light.
. .the full urgency of the situation in 1978—“the Citicorp
building could fall on Bloomingdales”[sic]—had never been
revealed. The Cambridge, Massachusetts-based designer says he “had
to tell a few white lies” in order to avoid revealing all of his
concerns. “I wasn’t ready yet.”41
LeMessurier presented “Forty Years of Wind Engineering: A
Personal Memoir” in early April 1995 during the Thirteenth
Structures Congress of the ASCE (American Society of Civil
Engineers) in Boston. Published by ASCE in its congress proceedings
later that year, the paper spans from his graduate student days at
M.I.T. through his role in the structural design of landmark
high-rise towers across the nation and abroad. He explains in the
“Introduction” that he will “describe the learning process
through discussion of several design problems of real buildings.”42
Understandably, Citicorp is treated at length yet there is no
mention of its structural crisis or of the lessons learned from it.
In late 1991, some years before the ASCE Congress, writer Joe
Morgenstern, who had learned of Citicorp tower’s structural crisis
during a dinner party conversation, telephoned LeMessurier. After
several weeks delay while he checked Morgenstern’s references and
reviewed samples of his work, LeMessurier and he traveled from
Cambridge to the house in Maine where the story was recounted in
minute detail during a long weekend. The manuscript for “The
Fifty-Nine- Story Crisis” and The New Yorker’s
fact-checking efforts were completed two years before its
publication43 at the end of May 1995 less than two months
after LeMessurier elected to omit all reference to the crisis in
discussing Citicorp with his audience of engineers.
Professionals’ initial responses to the Citicorp Center tower
case may have derived from its dramatic journalistic presentation,
and from an understandable desire to perceive their eminent
colleague at the center of the drama as a hero. Nonetheless,
architects and engineers are well acquainted with professional norms
and professional codes of ethics. And ethicists who study these
professions continue to add to the enormous body of critical-case
literature and so I am perplexed by the absence of a reevaluation of
the conventional wisdom on this celebrated case.
Although I have invested a good deal of effort in exploring this
case, some of the concerns I have voiced are based on matters that
are immediately evident in The New Yorker article. Within
months of that story’s publication the concerns of three engineers
directly involved with the tower during its design, construction, or
repair were reported in Engineering News Record. A November
20, 1995 article, “Critics Grade Citicorp Confession,” reported
that two senior engineers in William LeMessurier’s office engaged
in the design of the Citicorp Center tower disputed significant
aspects of The New Yorker account.44 Three weeks
earlier, an ENR article, “LeMessurier’s Confession,”
concluded by reporting that the office of Leslie Robertson, the
distinguished engineer who served as a consultant to Citicorp during
the crisis, had written a letter implying that the problems were
worse than LeMessurier acknowledged in The New Yorker.45
To my knowledge those who have continued to celebrate the case have
pursued none of this and have ignored the 1998 NSPE BER Case 98–9
finding, as well as the results of the 1999 NSPE BER Ethics Contest.
Some of these thoughts on Citicorp Center tower have been shared
with design professionals and with academic colleagues in the United
States and Australia. I am in correspondence with people who helped
design and repair the tower, with others who have written about the
crisis and its resolution, and with still others who are experts on
codes, engineering practices, and ethics. Some have responded to
inquiries about Citicorp with interest and insight. Others have made
evident their desire to avoid comment. Still others have voiced
outrage at any further examination of this subject. I continue to
study Citicorp in an effort to enhance understanding of professional
responsibility among students, practitioners, and the larger public.
1. Greg Clark and James Parrott, “Economic Development Policies
in London and New York,” Chapter 11, London—New York Study: The
Economies of Two Great Cities at the Millennium, (London:
Corporation of London, June 2000) 90.
2. Daily News, October 30, 1975: 1.
3. The New York City and Long Island Traveler’s Companion, special
advertising supplement to New York Magazine, 1997: A–2.
4. Joe Morgenstern, “The Fifty-Nine-Story Crisis,” The New
Yorker, May 29, 1995: 45–53.
7. Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering and Practice,
v.123, n.1, January 1997: 23.
8. Andrew Pressman, Professional Practice 101(New York: John Wiley
& Sons, Inc., 1997) 58.
9. Caroline Whitbeck, Ethics in Engineering Practice and Research,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1998) 154.
10. Charles E. Harris, Jr.; Michael S. Pritchard; Michael J. Rabins,
Engineering Ethics: Concepts and Cases, Second ed. (Stamford, CT:
Wadsworth: 2000) 7.
11. Daniel A. Taylor, Professional Conduct, (Washington, DC:
National Council of Architectural Registration Boards: 2000) 16.
12. “The Fifty-Nine-Story Crisis,” 45–46.
13. Article 8, Materials, Loads and Stresses, Sub-Article 3, Loads,
Section C26–349, “Administrative Building Code with Amendments
to December 1968,” 1969 Manual New York Building Laws(New York:
New York Society of Architects).
14. Matthys Levy; Mario Salvadori, Why Buildings Fall Down: How
Structures Fail(New York: W. W. Norton, 1992).
15. Matthys Levy, e-mail to Eugene Kremer May 29, 2002.
16. Robert McNamara, e-mail to Eugene Kremer, February 11, 2002.
17. Stanley Goldstein, February 2001 annotation on January 20, 2001
working paper by Eugene Kremer. 18. Stanley Goldstein, National
Society of Professional Engineers New York Chapter presentation,
October 12, 1995.
19. Stanley Goldstein, February 4, 2002 letter to Eugene Kremer.
20. “The Fifty-Nine-Story Crisis,” 46. William LeMessurier,
videotape of Mechanical Engineering Colloquium at Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, The Fifty Nine Story Crisis: A Lesson in
Professional Behavior, November 17, 1995.
21. Robert McNamara, e-mail to Eugene Kremer February 11, 2002.
Robert McNamara, letter to Joe Morgenstern, December 18, 1995.
22. “The Fifty-Nine-Story Crisis,” 47–48.
23. Fatal Flaw: A Skyscraper’s Nightmare, BBC/A&E
24. “The Fifty-Nine-Story Crisis,” 47–48. The Fifty Nine Story
Crisis: A Lesson in Professional Behavior.
26. “The Fifty-Nine-Story Crisis,” 49–51.
27. “Citicorp Tower Gets More Steel Bracing As Added Precaution,”
The Wall Street Journal, August 9, 1978, 15.
28. Joseph Martin, “Citicorp Bldg. to Get 1M Wind Bracing,”
Daily News, August 9, 1978.
30. “Engineer’s Afterthought Sets Welders to Work Bracing Tower,”
Engineering News Record, August 17, 1988, 11.
31. “NSPE Code of Ethics for Engineers,” http://www.nspe.org/ethics/eh1-code.asp.
32. Fatal Flaw: A Skyscraper’s Nightmare.
33. BBC Online All Fall Downhttp://www.co.uk/works/s1/falldown.
34. The Fifty Nine Story Crisis: A Lesson in Professional Behavior.
35. Stanley H. Goldstein; Robert A. Rubin, “Engineering Ethics,”
Civil Engineering, October 1996, v. 66, n. 10, 40–44.
36. Arthur Schwartz, Deputy Executive Director & General
Counsel, National Society of Professional Engineers, e-mail to
Eugene Kremer March 13, 2002. Richard Simberg, National Society of
Professional Engineers Board of Ethical Review member, e- mail to
Eugene Kremer April 30, 2002.
37. “Case 98–9, Duty to Report Unsafe Conditions/Client Request
for Secrecy,” National Society of Professional Engineers Board of
Ethical Review, http://www.niee.org/cases/98%20cases/cases98-
38. Richard Simberg, e-mail to Eugene Kremer April 30, 2002. 39. “You
be the Judge: 1999 Ethics Contest,” Engineering Times,
August/September 1999: 3.
40. “Winning Entry: 1999 NSPE Board of Ethical Review Ethics
Contest,” Engineering Ethics Update, November 1999, v. 9, n. 3: 6.
41. Richard Korman, “LeMessurier’s Confession,” Engineering
News Record, October 30, 1995: 10.
42. William J. LeMessurier, “Forty Years of Wind Engineering: A
Personal Memoir,” Proceedings of the 13th Structures Congress, v
2, (New York: American Society of Civil Engineers, 1995) 1243–1252.
43. Joe Morgenstern, e-mail to Eugene Kremer April 15, 2002.
44. “Critics Grade Citicorp Confession.”
45. “LeMessurier’s Confession.”
This essay was first presented at the “Ethics and
Architecture” conference on April 6, 2002, at the Cathedral of St.
John the Divine in New York City co-sponsored by CrossCurrents.